





T H O M A S R O H K R AÈ M E R
Since the `classical' studies of Fritz Stern, Kurt Sontheimer and George Mosse1 the
view has been wide-spread among historians that a uniquely German tradition of
romantic `voÈlkish thinking' and `the politics of cultural despair' contributed to the
destruction of the Weimar Republic and the rise of National Socialism. The
psychological strain of a fast and crisis-ridden industrialisation process is supposed to
have provoked an antimodern sentiment in large parts of the population. The
critique of modern technology, capitalism and a pluralistic society on the one hand
and the irrational dream of a harmonious, truly German `community of the people'
on the other allegedly reached its logical culmination in the Nazi ideology of `blood
and soil', the cult of the charismatic leader and the totalitarian integration of all
`worthy' members of society, connected with the annihilation of all `unworthy'
members.
But this belief in a peculiarly German antimodernism reaching its climax in
National Socialism had to raise the question of how, if they had rejected modern
means, the Nazis could have achieved political propaganda successes, economic
recovery, the mobilisation of society and spectacular military victories or indeed
terror and mass extermination. One in¯uential answer to this is Jeffrey Herf 's
concept of `reactionary modernism' which identi®es the `reconciliation between
the antimodernist, romantic, and irrationalist ideas' and `modern technology' as
peculiar to the radical right in the Weimar Republic and National Socialism. In
1 Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair. A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology (1961); 2nd
edn. with a new preface, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Kurt Sontheimer, Antidemokra-
tisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik. Die politischen Ideen des deutschen Nationalismus zwischen 1918 und
1933, 2nd end. (Munich: DTV, 1983); George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology. Intellectual Origins
of the Third Reich, 2nd edn. (New York: Schocken Books, 1981). See also Georg LukaÂcs, Die ZerstoÈrung
der Vernunft (Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand, 1962) and the later summary of the arguments in
Henry J. Turner, `Fascism and Modernisation', in Reappraisals in Fascism, Henry J. Turner, ed. (New
York: New View Points 1975), 117±39.
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combining `political reaction with technological advance' they `turned the
romantic anticapitalism of the German right away from backward-looking pastor-
alism, pointing instead to the outlines of a beautiful new order'. According to
Herf, this contradictory combination of reactionary political ideas and a modern
reliance on instrumental reason and modern means made Nazism possible.2
In this article I want to put forward a critique of the concepts `antimodernism'
and `reactionary modernism'.3 First I will attempt to show that a conservative
acceptance of technology is not speci®c to the Weimar Republic, but was already
dominant in imperial Germany. But, secondly, one has to agree with Herf on
stressing the importance of the First World War for initiating a change in attitude
towards a belief that the state has to accept responsibility for the running of the
economy and large technological systems. This emergence of an ideology of
technocratic planning will be exempli®ed by looking at two people who expressed
these tendencies at length and with exceptional clarity: Walther Rathenau and
Ernst JuÈnger. This concentration on a couple of ®gures to illustrate a more general
trend of the time is obviously problematic and provokes the legitimate question of
their representativeness (even though they were undoubtedly very in¯uential in
their time). But as the article is mainly concerned with critically evaluating theories
of historians which causally link intellectuals and the reality of the Third Reich,
the procedure seems appropriate for the task at hand. Nevertheless, it should be
seen simply as a device enabling me to deal with a broad topic in the limited space
of an article.4
After establishing the main features of the new attitude towards technology
emerging after the First World War and shaping the thinking of the new right in
the Weimar Republic, it will then be, thirdly, compared with the National
Socialists' attitude. I will try to show that the Third Reich, while largely accepting
technology, was much less technocratically oriented than the `modernists' of the
Weimar Republic. Avoiding any kind of purism, their pragmatic and often
inconsistent use of technology is closer to the traditional attitude of the nineteenth
century than to Ernst JuÈnger's enthusiastic embrace of technology in all its systemic
consequences.
In concluding, I will re¯ect on the impact of my analysis on the concepts of
`antimodernism' and `reactionary modernism'.
2 Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 1 f. See
also the more recent restatement of his theory in `Der nationalsozialistische Technikdiskurs. Die
deutschen Eigenheiten des reaktionaÈren Modernismus', in Wolfgang Emmerich and Carl Wege, eds.,
Der Technikdiskurs in der Hitler-Stalin-AÈ ra (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1995), 72±93.
3 While many social theorists have become convinced that National Socialism is a modern
phenomenon, the belief in its antimodern character is still widespread among historians. See for
example `Technik', in Wolfgang Benz et al., eds., EnzyklopaÈdie des Nationalsozialismus, (Munich: DTV,
1997).
4 My new book, Einer andere Moderne? Zivilisationskritik, Natur und Technik in Deutschland, 1880±
1933, (Paderborn: Schoeningh, 1999) deals at length with social movements expressing these techno-
cratic tendencies.
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IThe combination of a reactionary political orientation and a fully-¯edged accep-
tance of technology can strike one as `paradoxical'5 only if one believes with Jeffrey
Herf that technology is normally accepted by liberals, democrats or socialists and
rejected by reactionaries. This assumption has some plausibility, if we take reaction
to mean the political attempt to turn back the clock and restore a past society. But
since neither the radical right in the Weimar Republic nor National Socialism
harked back to a previous epoch, we have to interpret the term `reactionary' in this
context more loosely as authoritarian and right-wing. Can we really say that these
political groups tend to have a problem with instrumental reason and technology?
It only takes a cursory glance at developing countries in the past and present to
realise that anti-democratic and anti-liberal authoritarianism frequently goes to-
gether with efforts towards technological modernisation. This is also the case in
regard to imperial Germany, where technological progress was largely accepted.
Most of those social groups and individuals which were denounced as Luddites and
enemies of progress both by progressive liberals of the time6 and by later historians,
did not reject technology as such, but only particular aspects of technological
development which threatened their material existence.7 The largest agrarian
interest group `Bund der Landwirte' did not ®ght industrialisation as a whole, but
aimed for an `agrarian and industrial state';8 the leader of the Pan-Germans, Heinrich
Class, warned of the dangers connected with ruthless industrialisation, but in
principle accepted its `necessity';9 and scientists, stressing the need of a large rural
population to keep up a high birth-rate, accepted that parts of the population
surplus had to migrate into the cities to keep up industrial production.10 The
military did not reject modern means, but accepted technological change on an
unprecedented scale. New line-of-battle ships and submarines, smokeless gun-
5 Herf claims: `It is paradoxical to reject the Enlightenment and embrace technology at the same
time.' `With the exception of the reactionary modernists, those who rejected the Enlightenment and its
legacy rejected technology, whereas those who defended the Enlightenment accepted the need for
technical development' (Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 3, 42).
6 For example J. Wernicke, Der Kampf um den wirtscha¯ichen Fortschritt ( Jena: Gustav-Fischer Verlag,
1910). In the following I will keep the references to a minimum, as this will be dealt with in detail in
my forthcoming book (see footnote 4).
7 Agriculture, for example, used romantic notions to gain support in their ®ght for protective tariffs,
but they simultaneously increased their production in the German empire by 73% and their productivity
by 40% (H.-U. Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1849±1914 (Munich: Beck, 1996), 1266, 685 f.).
For the reaction of craftsmen see W. KoÈnig, `Massenproduktion und Technikkonsum. Entwicklungsli-
nien und TriebkraÈfte der Technik zwischen 1880 und 1914', in PropylaÈen Technikgeschichte, Vol. 4, ed.
Wolfgang KoÈnig (Berlin: PropylaÈen, 1990), 263±552, at 547.
8 So the of®cial voice of the BdL as quoted in Jens Flemming, Landwirtschaftliche Interessen und
Demokratie. LaÈndliche Gesellschaft, AgrarverbaÈnde und Staat 1890±1925 (Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaf,
1978), 38 (emphasis in original). All quotations are translated by me.
9 Daniel Frymann [that is Heinrich Class], Wenn ich der Kaiser waÈr' ± Politische Wahrheiten und
Notwendigkeiten, 5th edn., (Leipzig: DieterichÂsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1914), 127.
10 See for example Otto Ammon, Die Bedeutung des Bauernstandes fuÈr den Staat und die Gesellschaft,
2nd edn., (Berlin: Frundsberg, 1906 [1894]), 36 f., 24 f.
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powder whose strength was increased threefold, better ri¯es and cannons, new
means of communication such as wireless telegraph and telephone, revolutionary
means of transport such as cars, lorries, airships and aircraft, all signi®ed a dramatic
technological shift.11 The educated middle class, which has often been blamed for
its rejection of modernity,12 accepted technology to a large extent. In Sunday
speeches they stressed the importance of the `spiritual' in contrast to the vulgar
`material', but in everyday life they `obviously needed engineers' and industry and
were quite conscious of this.13 Even the youth movement, which is often cited as a
prime example of a ¯ight away from the industrial present, did not want to turn
away from modernity. They enjoyed their hiking and appreciated nature, but they
explicitly rejected the `nature enthusiasm of the eighteenth century' and Rousseau's
`return to nature'14 and visited large cities and industrial sites on their tours through
the country.15 And, as I have tried to show elsewhere,16 even critics of civilisation
did not reject technology completely, but tried to ®nd ways to use it in accordance
with their ideas of a natural and cultured society.
II
People realised the importance of technology before 1914, but the First World War
nevertheless came as a shock because it fundamentally questioned the widespread
belief that technology was an occasionally dif®cult but potentially obedient servant
of humanity. Not only the common soldiers in combat felt the overwhelming
power of modern weapons, but so also did the military and political leadership, who
were forced to change all of their plans to adapt to the realities of industrial and
technological warfare. Strategies had to take account of the superiority of means of
defence, and the long duration of the war, combined with the increased demand for
military material, forced all belligerent nations to mobilise every sector of society.
War was no longer a matter solely of the military sector as scienti®c achievements,17
the potential for industrial production and the mental preparedness for war were at
11 If the military was sceptical about new technologies, it was largely because they could not see its
potential and were afraid of investing in a ¯op. But problems and mistakes in evaluating new technology
should not be confused with a general scepticism about new technology.
12 Most in¯uential is Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1969).
13 Friedrich Dessauer, Streit um die Technik (Frankfurt/M.: Verlag Josef Knecht, 1956), 24.
14 Quoted in Jakob MuÈller, Die Jugendbewegung als deutsche Hauptrichtung neukonservativer Reform
(ZuÈrich: Europa Verlag, 1971), 35. On their longer trips some groups even visited cities and factories
and they all used trains and modern equipment without any hesitation.
15 Hermann Hoffmann quoted in Wolfgang Sauer, `Der Mythos des Naturerlebnisses in der
Jugendbewegung', in Joachim H. Knoll and Julius H. Schoeps, eds., Typisch deutsch: Die Jugendbewegung.
BeitraÈge zu einer PhaÈnomenengeschichte (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1988), 55±70, at 60.
16 Th. RohkraÈmer, `Formen der konservativen Technikkritik in Deutschland 1890±1933', in
Humanismus und Technik, Jahrbuch 1994, Vol. 38 (Berlin, 1995), 18±34.
17 The most striking example was the arti®cal production of nitrogen, a technique which was only
discovered shortly before the war. As nitrogen, which had been largely imported before 1914, was
essential for the production of fertilisers and explosives, Britain's naval blockade might well have led to a
quick Allied victory, if science and technology had not provided a way to produce it arti®cially.
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least as important for success as the armed forces themselves. These developments
seriously questioned previous hopes by the German empire to subordinate modern
means to traditional forms and ideals. The pressure to attempt total mobilisation in
modern warfare forced nations to accept the industrial and technological logic
unreservedly, that is to say, with all the often unwanted consequences a strong focus
on ef®ciency implied.
A good example of the change of attitude in leading circles is Walther
Rathenau.18 He was a leading protagonist in the new electrical industry and also
showed ambitions in the political sphere. In 1914 he was put in charge of organising
the change from a peacetime to a war economy. Although Rathenau only stayed in
of®ce until he had implemented an organisational structure, he unquestionably
played a crucial role in preparing Germany for a longer war by establishing public
control over the commercial use of scarce raw materials. In enabling the economy
to cope with the trade blockade, his organisation made Germany's war effort
sustainable over a longer period of time.
Rathenau was not only a leading man in the practical world, but also a prominent
critic of modern civilisation. In his numerous pre-war publications he lamented the
destruction of historic buildings, the decline of artistic production and even the
replacement of a courageous and honourable nobility by a more pragmatic,
positivistic and materialistic propertied middle class.19 While Rathenau accepted
what he called `mechanisation' (that is modern technology, instrumental reason and
the drive for ef®ciency), regarding technological development as necessary to feed a
growing population, he attacked the concomitant cultural and social developments
of modern societies. His hope and belief was that the human soul could overcome
these shortcomings in the future by replacing the motivation of material egoism in
the economy by a motivation through love, respect for others and a sense of duty
towards society. Not different institutions or material changes, but a different
attitude (service to the nation instead of capitalist competition) would make it
possible to realise a higher form of existence combining the achievements of
technology with a renewed emphasis on moral values, a just and humane society,
artistic productivity and a harmonious national culture.
With the First World War, this organiser of war industry fundamentally revised
his world view, moving from pleading for a moral revival to advocating technocratic
state measures. For Rathenau, the development towards a directed economy with
stronger state involvement was not just an ad hoc wartime measure, but the
beginning of a fundamental change which would destroy `the gods which the world
before August 1914 had worshipped'.20 He expected the competitive principle of
18 A reliable biography is Ernst Schulin, Walther Rathenau (GoÈttingen: Muster-Schmidt Verlag,
1979).
19 Walther Rathenau, `Mechanik des Geistes oder vom Reich der Seele`, in Rathenau, Hauptwerke
und GespraÈche, (Munich: Gotthold MuÈller Verlag, 1977), 236; Rathenau, `Kritik der Zeit' in Rathenau,
Hauptwerke und GespraÈche, 24, 34 f.
20 Rathenau in a letter to Hermann Stehr (14 Aug. 1914) quoted in Ernst Schulin, `Zu Rathenaus
Hauptwerken' in Rathenau, Hauptwerke und GespraÈche, 558.
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capitalism to make room for a social economy (Gemeinwirtschaft) characterised by
stronger state control, corporate structures and extensive social regulations. His pre-
war belief in ethical change was replaced by the technocratic vision that an
improved organisation of national economy would overcome the problems of
`mechanisation'. The future would see the emergence of a large semi-governmental
economic structure which was supposed to combine entrepreneurial freedom with
extensive controls by the state to ensure the common good.
The practical changes Rathenau proposed could not satisfy true socialists, but
were surprisingly radical for a member of the bourgeoisie. He demanded an
`extensive, in parts nearly prohibitive, system of income duties, taxes and levies' to
restrict luxury consumption, the prevention of speculation through controls and
taxes, an extremely progressive property and income tax and the prohibition of
every inheritance `above a moderate property'.21 Social mobility should also be
increased to give every citizen equal career opportunities,22 both to increase social
justice and to make more ef®cient use of the nation's human potential. The state
was supposed to ensure that priority was given to the common good. As `the
economy is not a private, but a public matter', the state should have extensive
powers to prevent any inef®cient, egoistic and malevolent use of entrepreneurial
freedom.23 The government should make it its policy to enforce the highest possible
ef®ciency by centralising power generation and distribution, by improving produc-
tivity in industry through enforcement of rationalisation programmes (including the
closing down of inef®cient production sites), by reducing the existing variety to a
few standardised products, and by organising distribution more ef®ciently by
replacing the many small retailers by a few large warehouses. In short, Rathenau
developed a comprehensive technocratic programme for a state-directed economy.
His aim was an ethically superior and more ef®cient society, where the state ensured
the primacy of public over private interest. His practical measures had little to do
with his earlier idealist hopes or with the interests of an individual capitalist, but
described a whole national economy and society arranged according to the
organisational principles of a large and ef®cient company.
Rathenau's ideas were new and original, but his rapid reorientation as well as the
public interest in his ideas were partly due to the fact that the ground had already
been prepared before the war. Many technically minded people had long been
sceptical of capitalism. It seemed to hinder the realisation of important technical
ideas due to a capitalist demand for short-term pro®ts, seemed to get in the way of
an ef®cient economy of scale, because the same goods were produced in different
companies, and seemed to promote wasteful aberrations because of a lack of
planning. For technicians and engineers it was only logical to develop the vision of a
national economy organised as a single ef®cient machine. Furthermore, the German
empire was marked by a change towards corporate capitalism, with many companies
21 Rathenau, `Von kommenden Dingen', in Rathenau, Hauptwerke und GespraÈche, 370, 373.
22 Rathenau, `Von kommenden Dingen', 368.
23 Rathenau, `Von kommenden Dingen', 348.
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merging or forming cartels. The electrical industry especially tried to pro®t from
economy of scale in production of electrical equipment, from the higher ef®ciency
of larger power stations and from a more balanced load when supplying power to
large areas and diverse customers. The economic advantage of large `networks of
power',24 the close cooperation with the state to establish monopolies whereby the
coexistence of several parallel electrical networks could be avoided, the need for
cooperation between different companies and banks to ®nance investments on an
unprecedented scale, all this offered experiences which suggested that the trend was
towards concentration and planning and that a national economy might also pro®t
from replacing the chaos of competition by a larger economic strategy.
But there was also powerful opposition to a planned national economy. The
large majority of employers, whilst being open to the merging of companies, to
cartels and to agreements with the state to avoid damaging competition and achieve
reliable conditions for investments, was eager to maintain capitalist independence.
The exceptional situation of a war made them prepared to accept a state role in
economic matters, but only as a strictly temporary emergency measure. Faced with
the widespread public interest in the ideas of Rathenau25 and like-minded people
such as the economists Wichard von Moellendorf, Gerhart von Schulze-Gaevernitz,
Edgar JaffeÂ and Werner Sombart, as well as the political scientist Johann Plenge,
employers started a big campaign attacking the measures `against which the most
radical demands of socialist revolutionaries appear comparatively harmless'26 and
demanding the speedy return to a peacetime economy.27
A continuation of the war economy after 1918 never stood a real chance.
Employers and trade unions opposed it both in principle and because it had led to
gross mismanagement and social injustices. But the ideas nevertheless maintained
their importance in the Weimar Republic because they remained attractive among
civil servants, the military and the middle class. They promised a third way between
Marxist socialism and an unrestricted market economy, similar to that for which the
imperial Verein fuÈr Sozialpolitik (Association for Social Policy) had searched; they
promoted a strong state overcoming class divisions and the most severe social
injustices, an idea particularly attractive to all those middle-class groups afraid of a
revolution and of being squashed between the powerful employers' and working-
class organisations; they raised the hope that a competitive society based on self-
interest could be replaced by a more humane cooperative and `organic' society; and
they promised nationalistically and militaristically minded people the possibility of
preparing Germany for a new and more successful war. If there was a need to
reduce social tensions in order to turn society into a united front against potential
24 Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power. Electri®cation in Western Society, 1880±1933 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983).
25 Schulin calls `Von kommenden Dingen' one of the `most widely read analyses of the war period'
(`Zu Rathenaus Hauptwerken', 555). 65,000 copies were printed before July 1918.
26 Deutsche Arbeitgeber-Zeitung, quoted in Schulin, `Zu Rathenaus Hauptwerken', 580.
27 JuÈrgen Kocka, Facing Total War. German Society 1914±1918 (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1984), 110;
Friedrich Zunkel, Industrie und Staatssozialismus (DuÈsseldorf: Droste, 1974), 31, 99 and passim.
Antimodernism, Reactionary Modernism and National Socialism 35
enemy countries, if self-suf®ciency was seen as a necessary preparation for a trade
blockade in a future war and if industry should be capable of changing instanta-
neously to war production, then an economy directed by the state seemed to be the
appropriate solution. For the promoters of a state-directed social economy the
changes needed to cope with the demands of the First World War proved the
superiority of their model. Despite all the problems connected with the war
economy, for which they largely blamed the improvised character of the measures,
they were convinced that the dif®cult times had proved the need for more planning.
Only a state-directed economy would be able to cope with the demands of a long
war of attrition in the industrial age. The deprivation of the population and the
desolate state of the economy in 1918 were negligible in this line of argument in
comparison with the state economy's ability to maintain the war effort for four
years.
The belief in a state-directed social economy was not limited to the political
right. Engineers of different political persuasions continued with their complaints
that capitalism would thwart the potential of modern technology through its narrow
focus on short-term pro®ts;28 demands for the rule of technical competence over
the whole of society were voiced29 and the economic crisis of 1929 saw the
emergence of a technocratic movement which wanted to replace a capitalist by a
technological logic.30 But it was on the political right that technocratic ideas were
mainly justi®ed with reference to the First World War and the demands of modern
warfare in general. Large parts of the so-called `Conservative Revolution' (that is,
the radical right who wanted to develop an up-to-date ideology for an authoritarian
state instead of dreaming about a way back to the German empire) were convinced
that Germany could re-emerge as a powerful nation only if it accepted economic
and technical imperatives without reservation.31 Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, the
old man of the Conservative Revolution, unhesitatingly incorporated modern
industry and technology into his `German socialism' (a concept which shows many
parallels with the war economy);32 the philosopher Oswald Spengler urged the
28 See for example the in¯uential engineers Alois Riedler, Schenk, Weyrauch and Friedrich
Dessauer as well as the position of the engineers' organisation VDI.
29 Most importantly by the Reichsbund Deutscher Technik and engineers such as Dessauer.
30 Stefan Willeke, Die Technokratiebewegung in Nordamerika und Deutschland zwischen den Weltkriegen
(Frankfurt/M.: Lang, 1995). The most active voice of the technocracy movement, Hardensett, shared
many conservative ideas, but was internationally and paci®stically oriented (Heinrich Hardensett, Der
kapitalistische und der technische Mensch (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1932), 125).
31 One of the exceptions is Werner Sombart, one of Herf 's prime examples of a `reactionary
modernist'. He is rather sceptical of technology and tries to ®nd ways for its control (`ZaÈhmung'), for
example a strict control of the implementation of technology to avoid bothersome noise, dis®gurement
of the countryside and damage to human health, as well as a cultural committee with the power of
banning inventions which are not bene®cial to society (Werner Sombart, Deutscher Sozialismus,
Charlottenburg: Buchholz & Weisswange, 266).
32 Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Das Dritte Reich, 3rd edn., (published 1922) (Hamburg:
Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1931), especially 116 ff. See also his positive attitude towards Italian
Futurism (`Die Probleme des Futurismus' (1912) and `Die radikale Ideologie des jungen Italiens' (1913),
reprinted in Peter Demetz, Worte in Freiheit. Der italienische Futurismus und die deutsche literarische
Avantgarde 1912±1934. Mit einer ausfuÈhrlichen Dokumentation (Munich: Piper, 1990), 228±40.
36 Contemporary European History
younger generation to devote their lives to `technology instead of poetry' and to
`the navy instead of painting';33 the eminent specialist in public law Carl Schmitt
waited for a political force able to make productive use of technology;34 and
Ferdinand Friedrich Zimmermann alias Ferdinand Fried, the economic specialist of
Tat (the most widely read journal of the Conservative Revolution), explicitly
accepted the publications of Walther Rathenau as the basis of his own economic
ideas and demanded the running of a national economy according to government
plans.35 But the person who eventually took this train of thought to its logical
conclusion was Ernst JuÈnger, the most prominent representative of a group of
young people proclaiming a new `soldierly nationalism'.36
As a young adolescent JuÈnger was one of the many middle-class volunteers who
in 1914 saw the First World War as a chance to escape from the boredom of a
secure everyday life. A sense of national duty seems not to have motivated him,37
but the hope of ®nding his `true self ' and a more `elemental reality' outside
bourgeois society. This hope and desire to engage on an adventurous journey to
discover one's authentic existence beyond the allegedly false conventions of civilised
society was not a `premodern' notion, but an expression of a `romantic individu-
alism' originating in the artistic way of life of early romanticism, giving the central
motif to many modern writings and representing a common ambition for the avant-
garde and life reform movements at the turn of the century.38 In a similar vein,
JuÈnger believed that society in the `mechanical age' restricted the potential of a
much richer self, while a more authentic life promised the discovery of one's own
individuality and the experience of the `multitude of life, its diversity and the
glowing beauty of its intoxications'.39
But JuÈnger was quickly forced to realise that his naive notions of a warrior's life
had little in common with modern warfare. The First World War, which was
dominated by technology and the large-scale production of weapons, might well
33 Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes, 9th edn., (Munich: DTV, 1988 [1918, 1922]),
57.
34 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen. Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien, 2nd
edn. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963), 81 ff., esp. 94.
35 Ferdinand Fried, Das Ende des Kapitalismus ( Jena: Eugen Diederich, 1931), 144, 23 and 46.
36 In recent years extensive secondary literature about Ernst JuÈnger has emerged, but for his politics
in the Weimar Republic the most useful book is still Karl PruÈmm, Die Literatur des Soldatischen
Nationalismus der 20er Jahre (1918±1933). Gruppenideologie und Epochenproblematik, 2 vols. (Kronberg/Ts.:
Scriptor, 1974). JuÈnger's attitude towards technology is most convincingly dealt with in Michael
Groûheim, OÈ kologie oder Technokratie? Der Konservatismus in der Moderne (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,
1995) and Rolf Peter Sieferle, Die konservative Revolution. FuÈnf biographische Skizzen (Frankfurt/M.:
Fischer, 1995). See also RohkraÈmer, `Formen der konservativen zivilisations kritik'.
37 Both later recollections and the fact that he had previously tried to get to Africa by joining the
Foreign Legion suggest this.
38 Christoph Hennig, Die Entfesselung der Seele. Romantischer Individualismus in den deutschen
Alternativkulturen (Frankfurt and New York: Campus-Verlag, 1989). See also more generally Cornelia
Klinger, Flucht, Trost, Revolte. Die Moderne und ihre aÈsthetischen Gegenwelten (Munich and Vienna:
Hanser, 1995).
39 Ernst JuÈnger, Das Abenteuerliche Herz. Aufzeichnungen bei Tag und Nacht (Berlin: Frundsberg,
1929), 25, 218.
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reveal some hidden truth about the modern age, but it was clearly not an ideal
opportunity for realising the romantic journey to the `true self '. The demands of
modern warfare were even more restrictive than modern society. Material neces-
sities dominated over idealistic notions of self-realisation. As JuÈnger was forced to
admit: `The emotions of the heart and the systems of the mind can be disproved,
while a material object cannot be disproved ± and such a material object is a
machine gun.' `Free will, education, enthusiasm and ecstatic contempt of death are
not enough to overcome the gravity of a few hundred metres, over which the
magic of mechanical death reigns.'40 Warfare in the industrial age turned out to be
just another example of a contradiction inherent in the project of modernity: the
modern concept of realising one's own potential and developing a singular
individuality clashed with the power of `second nature'; the technical apparatus
designed to overcome natural limitations developed its own momentum and
restricted human freedom by demanding the adaption to a technological logic of
action. The desire for adventure and emotional intensity is an integral part of
modernity, but for achieving success the industrial world demands ± in war as much
as in peace ± the precise work of every soldier or worker as a small cog in a large
technical system.
As JuÈnger did not want to accept the role of a Don Quixote, he was forced to
accept the challenge of modern technology. Inspired by Nietzsche, he could not
reject technology, which was clearly the prime instrument of the human `will to
power' in modern times.41 As there was no escape from the all-pervasive power of
technology, he had to ®nd a way of integrating it into his world-view. The
acceptance that it was not the `abilities of the individual' which counted in
modernity (in particular in modern warfare), but `production, level of technology,
education and railway systems'42 was a dif®cult step for JuÈnger as it challenged his
hope and desire for a less civilised space in which one could realise an adventurous
path of life. Technology confronted JuÈnger with a fundamental dilemma: it appeared
to be part of an oppressive modernity suffocating all human desire for adventure and
individual challenges, but at the same time it seemed to be the up-to-date expression
of human vitality which was unscrupulous in choosing the most effective means for
achieving its goals. On the one hand, he admitted a `deep fear' of modern
technology,43 but on the other, his Nietzschean convictions (`amor fati') forced him
to embrace all aspects of the modern condition. After a laborious struggle which
®nds re¯ection in the many different opinions expressed in his early writings,44 he
40 Ernst JuÈnger, Der Arbeiter. Herrschaft und Gestalt (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1932),
104, 105.
41 Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890±1990 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993), 200.
42 Ernst JuÈnger, `Sturm', in SaÈmtliche Werke, Vol. 15 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978), 16.
43 Quoted in Klausfrieder Bastian, Das Politische bei Ernst JuÈnger. Nonkonformismus und Kompromiû der
Innerlichkeit (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1963), 77.
44 See Th. RohkraÈmer, `Die Verzauberung der Schlange. Krieg, Technik und Zivilisationskritik
beim fruÈhen Ernst JuÈnger', in Wolfgang Michalka, ed., Der Erste Weltkrieg. Wirkung, Wahrnehmung,
Analyse (Munich: Piper, 1994), 849±74.
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reached a position towards the end of the 1920s where he strongly rejected any
glori®cation of nature or rural life by critics of civilisation as sterile `romanticism',
demanding an unreserved acceptance of modern life instead.45
It was not the conservative acceptance of technology which was original about
JuÈnger's position (most critics of civilisation in the German empire had been aware
of the need to ®nd a modus vivendi regarding technology); nor was it the attempt to
integrate it into his world view and employ it as a means for his own objectives (all
users aim to do this; enlightened thinkers have no monopoly on the use of
technology).46 What was new about JuÈnger and other conservative revolutionaries
at the end of the Weimar Republic were the two following convictions:
Firstly, while earlier conservatives had the con®dence to believe that modern
technology could be used at will, Ernst JuÈnger was correct in realising that technical
developments and applications followed their own logic and thus placed demands
on users. Different technical means could not be employed by any person for any
purpose, but only by people prepared to accept fully all demands of the technical
age, because individual technical means are part of an interdependent technical
system and cannot exist in isolation. Furthermore he developed the conviction that
a productive engagement with technology demanded a certain `language'. As users
have to follow a certain code to live in the technical world and make use of
technical means, modernity turns them not `just into subjects of technical processes,
but simultaneously into their objects'. `The application of these [technological]
means demands a speci®c lifestyle, which encompasses every single aspect of life.
Technology is thus by no means a neutral force, no reservoir of effective and simply
convenient means, which any traditional power can take from at pleasure'.47 The
First World War had taught JuÈnger an important lesson which the Weimar
Republic could only reinforce: that modern technology places precise demands on
its users, produces unintended results and becomes a force in its own right, shaping
history in unexpected and often unwanted ways. More than the critics of civilisation
in the German empire who had aimed for a technology controlled by traditional
society, JuÈnger was aware of the inevitable price one had to pay for using
technology.
Secondly, the First World War had radicalised the German right. The group of
`soldierly nationalists' in particular was more extreme in its militarism and expan-
sionism than any pre-war group. Ernst JuÈnger and the people around him had no
doubt that the re-establishment of German power had to be the central political
goal. They were convinced about the primacy of a foreign policy based on power
and were prepared to implement all domestic changes necessary for strengthening
45 Ernst JuÈnger, `Ober¯aÈche-Tiefe. Nationalismus und Jugendbewegung', Standarte 1 (1926), 478.
See also E. JuÈnger, `Groûstadt und Land', Deutsches Volkstum, 8 (1926), 577±81 and JuÈnger, Der Arbeiter,
160.
46 The typically German contradiction Herf perceives in the concept of `reactionary modernism'
only exists if one assumes that enlightenment and technology belong together, an assumption with little
basis in historical evidence.
47 JuÈnger, Arbeiter, 158.
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Germany. The establishment of a planned economy, the introduction of a national
socialism or the organisation of society according to military principles: all these
measures were considered and adopted, because they promised to increase Germa-
ny's might. As JuÈnger believed that modern technology faced every modern human
being with an `inescapable either-or' of making full use of it or perishing, he was
forced to opt for the unlimited use of technology as a necessary means of any
ef®cient nationalistic and militaristic policy.
Throughout his work Ernst JuÈnger repeated the diagnosis of many critics of
civilisation: the ascendancy of industry and technology had meant a `total revolu-
tion' producing anonymous cities and a uniform society, destroying all individuality
in human beings and leading to a growing alienation from the natural world.48 But
while his acceptance of technology had been fatalistic throughout most of his life
(both before 1925 and after the early 1930s), the late Weimar Republic saw a
complete turn from forced acceptance to enthusiasm. In Der Arbeiter (`The
Worker'), his main work on technology published in 1932, JuÈnger blamed the
wrong attitude of the middle class for the shortcomings of modernity. He believed
that it was only their inability to adapt fully to the logic of technology that had led
to a loss of control over the modern world. Filled with optimism that history was on
his side, he expected that the coming full acceptance of technology would overcome
its negative effects. A new type of human being would be in tune with technology
and succeed in creating a harmonious world of humans and machines.
JuÈnger's vision of the future was clearly in¯uenced by different developments of
the interwar years which all seemed to point in a similar direction. He accurately
recognised a general trend towards more planning under many different ideological
guises. The economies in the First World War in all the belligerent countries, the
technocratic movement in the United States, the development towards larger
companies and more state intervention in capitalist nations (especially as a conse-
quence of the world economic crisis), corporatist structures in fascist Italy, ®ve-year
plans and forced industrialisation in the Soviet Union, all seemed to suggest that the
world was moving from an individualistic free-market economy to a collective and
planned one. Taking these trends to their logical conclusion, JuÈnger proclaimed that
the `chaos' produced by economic liberalism would be replaced by a `planned
economy', achieving an `organic construction, that is a close and con¯ict-free
merging of life with all the means it has at hand'. A group of experts employed by
the state would organise the technological world like one large machine and
consequently overcome the problems of the present.49
Many readers are left confused by the fact that JuÈnger avoids any clear political
stance. His description could ®t a fascist or bolshevist as well as an interventionist
capitalist system. But this openness is not an omission, it is a central component of
JuÈnger's argument. He was convinced that the political differences were nothing but
surface phenomena, that is different labels for one fundamental change towards
48 JuÈnger, Arbeiter, 162 (quotation), 61, 94, 98, 102 ff., 213.
49 JuÈnger, Arbeiter, 68, 290, 226, 281.
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increased planning. What he both diagnosed and welcomed was the emergence of a
new order (®rst on the national, later also on the global level), where nature, human
beings and machines would be united in one large technological system.50
While the First World War had forced Ernst JuÈnger to accept modern technology,
his belief in the power of technology to determine a whole culture made him
welcome it. He hated modern society for its lack of order and its pluralism, diversities
and contradictions and valued modern technology's alleged ability to overcome this
chaos. For him it was positive, if technological logic could replace chaos by order, as
he simply preferred any kind of order over any kind of disorder. Although he
continued to dislike some aspects of technology, the conservative wish for a
homogeneous culture triumphed.51
But who would be the carrier of all these far-reaching changes? JuÈnger's answer is
the `worker', by which he means every person for whom work is the centre of
existence. While previous social groups had wanted to use technology for other
means (the bourgeoisie, for example, for material bene®ts), this new type of human
being would be interested in work and ef®ciency for its own sake. As JuÈnger states:
in the age of the `worker' there will be nothing, `that will not be interpreted as
work. Work is the speed of the ®st, the thought of the heart, life day and night,
science, love, the arts, religion and cults, war; work is the movement of atoms and
the power which moves stars and solar systems'.52 In an act of `heroic realism', the
new human beings would accept the reality of the future world, abandoning any
wish for pleasure and comfort and dedicating their whole life to work and interpret
all events, human as well as non-human, as work.
In parts, JuÈnger's belief in the emergence of a universe dominated by work and
functionality re¯ects the experience of the modern world that these secondary
values become goals in themselves (the glori®cation of work and ef®ciency, the
mania in sports to achieve new records, the continued effort of rich people to make
money beyond anything they can ever spend, the race to the moon, etc.). But for
him it is also a translation of Nietzsche's beliefs into the present, as he sees dedication
to work motivated by the `will to power'. JuÈnger's worker does not want luxury or
comfort, but the feeling of having an impact and shaping reality. The eventual
outcome is secondary to the joy of ef®ciently achieving a task, that is experiencing
one's competence and power.
This new type of human being will eventually triumph, because his life is solely
devoted to work. As traditional social groups want to use technology for dysfunc-
tional goals such as an increase in consumption and physical wellbeing, they will be
less powerful than the worker who is only aiming for an increase in ef®ciency and
50 Technology should not be understood in the narrow sense, but should also include organisational
structures (factories, educational systems etc.) necessary to make the system work.
51 `The proof of this legitimation is given by controlling the things which have become all-
powerful' ( JuÈnger, Arbeiter, 76). The idea that any power legitimises itself by its capability of establishing
order is developed more thoroughly in the work of Carl Schmitt (see for example his book Der
Leviathan).
52 JuÈnger, Arbeiter, 65.
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power. He is able to merge himself with technology and give coherent shape to the
technological age, because he has an instrumental attitude to everything: all natural
phenomena, all machines, even his own body and mind are just raw materials. They
are turned into ef®cient machines and components of an ever more powerful
technical system. The result is an endless increase in ef®ciency and power largely for
its own sake.
If one believes in the emergence of the `worker', then it is only plausible to
expect that this new kind of human being will triumph over less single-minded
people. As they are more determined in aiming for their goals, the workers will be
able to realise their vision of a functional society. But since clusters of the new type
of human being are simultaneously emerging at different places, trying to realise
their own ambitions against those of other groups, JuÈnger envisaged a violent future
with a whole `succession of wars and civil wars'.53 The workers' expansionist power
politics make major military con¯icts inevitable, and these con¯icts in their turn will
reinforce the pressure to sacri®ce everything for ef®ciency's sake just to maintain
one's existence. Communities or states will have to mobilise as fully as possible.
They will be turned from passenger liners into battleships, work and war will
become identical and every citizen will become a combatant.54 JuÈnger even foresaw
kamikaze ®ghters, envisaging the merging of heroic men and machines (an `organic
construction') in torpedoes directed by human pilots.55
With this vision of the future, Ernst JuÈnger could combine his appreciation of the
power of technology with his desire for adventure by imagining an immense global
drama of war and creation. While the struggle of creation could satisfy his wish for
self-realisation, the order which was to follow ful®lled his conservative dreams for a
stable and homogeneous society. But what is more important in this context is that
JuÈnger is not untypical of trends in right-wing thought in the Weimar Republic: the
demand for total mobilisation to revise the Versailles Treaty and to ful®l Germany's
global ambitions often led to an unreserved acceptance of, or even enthusiasm for,
the potential of technical means. The primacy of foreign policy ambitions implied
the embrace of all means necessary to realise those ambitions, and most nationalists
in the Weimar Republic realised that modern technology played a crucial part in
any expansionist scheme.
III
We can thus conclude that Herf is right in stressing the right-wing acceptance of
technology in the Weimar Republic. There is a general tendency towards more
planning, economic concentration and rationalisation (directed or planned econo-
mies in fascist and communist countries, more state interventions in capitalist
systems in the First World War and after, economic concentration into ever
52 JuÈnger, Arbeiter, 75.
54 JuÈnger, Arbeiter, 75, 109.
55 JuÈnger, `UÈ ber den Schmerz' in Ernst JuÈnger, ed., BlaÈtter und Steine, (Hamburg: Hanseatische
Verlagsanstalt, 1934), 176 f.
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larger corporations, the debate about Taylorism, Fordism and Americanisation,
in¯uential technocratic movements especially during the world economic crisis,
etc.),56 and some intellectually alert groups of the extreme right tried to integrate
this trend into their world view. The phenomenon is neither as new nor as
surprising or contradictory as Herf argues, but there is clearly a new quality in the
unreserved acceptance of all aspects of technology. But now we come to question
the last point of his argument: does National Socialism really ®t into this tradition?
Is it as technocratic as Walther Rathenau and as techno-enthusiastic as Ernst
JuÈnger?
While racism, one of the core elements of National Socialism, played no part in
Ernst JuÈnger's thinking,57 there is undoubtedly a far-reaching similarity in their
extreme nationalism, militarism and anti-liberal authoritarianism. But what about a
connection between JuÈnger's attitude towards technology and National Socialism?
The opinions of the time were divided. While the Nazi press reviewed JuÈnger's
`Worker' rather critically,58 a biography of him published in 1934 stressed the debt
National Socialism owed to JuÈnger in learning to accept modern technology:
`Thanks to Ernst JuÈnger, technology is no longer a problem for the German youth
. . . JuÈnger has freed us from a nightmare.'59 But to claim such a direct in¯uence of
one individual writer on a whole political movement is problematic,60 as the
growing acceptance of technology was a much more general phenomenon on the
extreme right of the Weimar Republic. What I will be concerned with is not a
causal relation, but the question of similarities and differences between a position
like Ernst JuÈnger's and that of National Socialism.
The debate about the relationship between National Socialism and modernity/
modernisation, which started in the 1960s and which has ¯ared up again over the
last decade,61 has left many controversial points unresolved, but it has shown very
clearly that most leading National Socialists accepted modern technology or were
even enthusiastic about it. Hitler called himself a techno-enthusiast (`Narr der
Technik'), Goebbels said programmatically that National Socialism `consciously
approves' of technology and a publication of the SS called it a `weapon in the
56 This is illustrated by my being able to use Walther Rathenau as an example of this change of
attitude. See also Willeke (as footnote 31) and Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity. American Business and
the Modernization of Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). A good example of the in¯uence
of technocratic and authoritarian ideas on the popular imagination is Fritz Lang's ®lm Metropolis (1926).
57 While JuÈnger promotes the idea of the new heroic man, he believes in neither superior or
inferior races nor the achievement of his ideal through eugenic measures, but in changes of attitude.
58 PruÈmm, Der soldatische Nationalismus, 393.
59 Wulf Dieter MuÈller, Ernst JuÈnger. Ein Leben im Umbruch der Zeit (Berlin: Frundsberg, 1934), 42.
60 This is especially true, as Ernst JuÈnger had little political in¯uence in 1932. His political
engagement with `soldierly nationalism' had ended in disappointment by the end of the 1920s. The
most one can try to show is that JuÈnger expressed a wider cultural mood of the time, which made
people susceptible to National Socialism.
61 A good overview is Axel Schildt, `NS-Regime, Modernisierung und Moderne. Anmerkungen
zur Hochkonjunktur einer andauernden Diskussion', Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fuÈr deutsche Geschichte XXIII
(1994), 3±22. See also more recently Mark Roseman, `National Socialism and Modernisation', in
Richard Bessel, ed., Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Comparisons and contrasts, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 197±229.
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struggle for life'.62 Himmler and DarreÂ were more critical, but Albert Speer, Fritz
Todt and Robert Ley were also advocates of the unreserved embrace of modern
technology.63 Even the main representative of the voÈlkish wing, Alfred Rosenberg,
saw technology as an expression of an `eternal Germanic drive',64 and Peter
Schwerber's book `National Socialism and Technology', published in the Nazis'
of®cial series of pamphlets stressed technology's positive role. While it attacked the
banking system and the primacy of pro®ts in the capitalist system as an expression of
allegedly Jewish materialism and greed, it praised the potential of modern
technology and the deeds of entrepreneurs such as Krupp. The National Socialists,
Schwerber claimed, accepted technology `consciously and happily' as the foundation
of the nation, of a high standard of living and of military strength.65 With an equally
strong belief in the positive role of modern technology in changing society, Franz
Lawaczeck, one of the three founding fathers of the National Socialist engineers'
association, Kampfbund Deutscher Architekten und Ingenieure, believed that the
Third Reich could generate an abundance of cheap electricity that would promote
small farms and businesses and promote a decentralisation of modern society.66
In its presentation to the public, National Socialism also stressed its positive
attitude towards technology. With the slogan `Hitler above Germany', National
Socialism drew attention to his use of an aeroplane. Hitler presented himself
(wrongly) as the father of the motorway,67 opened car exhibitions and promoted
the idea of a cheap car for the mass of the people, not primarily for military or
economic purposes.68 He wanted to become a moderniser of German cities and had
a book of photographs published in which he presented himself alongside cars,
aeroplanes, ships and industrial sites.69 Also, the hope that a `Wunderwaffe' might
miraculously change the outcome of the war indicates a strong belief in the power
of technology.
The National Socialist agricultural policy is an area which many historians have
62 Adolf Hitler, Monologe im FuÈhrerhauptquartier 1941±1944, ed. Werner Jochmann (Hamburg: Knaus,
1980), 275 (9 Feb. 1942); Joseph Goebbels, `Rede zur EroÈffnung der Automobilausstellung 1939',
VoÈlkischer Beobachter, 18 Feb. 1939; `Mensch und Maschine', Das schwarze Korps, 28 Apr. 1938.
63 Jost DuÈlffer, `Albert Speer. Management fuÈr Kultur und Wirtschaft', in Ronald Smelser and
Rainer Zitelmann, eds., Die braune Elite. 22 biographische Skizzen, 2nd eds., (Darmstadt: Wissenschaf-
tliche Buchgesellschaft, 1990); Franz W. Seidler, Fritz Todt. Baumeister des Dritten Reiches (Berlin:
Herbig, 1986); Ronald Smelser, Robert Ley. Hitlers Mann an der `Arbeitsfront'. Eine Biographie (Paderborn:
SchoÈningh, 1989).
64 Alfred Rosenberg, Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts, 27th edn., (Munich: Hoheneichen-Verlag,
1934), 142 f.
65 Peter Schwerber, Nationalsozialismus und Technik. Die Geistigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Bewe-
gung, Nationalsozialistische Bibliothek, 21 (Munich: Verlag Franz Eher Nachf., 1930), 3 (quotation).
66 Franz Lawaczeck, Technik und Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich. Ein Arbeitsbeschaffungsprogramm
(Munich: Weiûsche Buchdruckerei, 1932).
67 The association `HAFRABA' had earlier promoted the idea of a motorway from Hamburg via
Frankfurt/M. to Basel.
68 Hans Mommsen with Manfred Grieger, Das Volkswagenwerk und seine Arbeiter im Dritten Reich
(DuÈsseldorf: Econ, 1996).
69 Hitler wie in keiner kennt. 100 Bilddokumente aus dem Leben des FuÈhrers, ed. Heinrich Hoffmann,
Fotoberichterstatter der Reichsleitung (Berlin, 1933).
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cited as one of the prime examples of the Nazis' alleged antimodernism. While it is
true that the importance they attached to land and a large rural population was
somewhat antiquated, one also has to remember that their policy was not directed
against industry ± they merely wanted a different balance between the primary and
the secondary sector by strengthening the former.70 Even more to the point: they
did not want to maintain traditional farming methods, but promoted the use of
machines, tractors, fertilisers and electri®cation. Their goal was to increase produc-
tion to achieve a higher degree of self-suf®ciency, and they were convinced that
they needed modern technology to achieve it.71
If one cannot speak about a rejection of technology in relation to National
Socialist agricultural policy (where the ideology of `blood and soil' was most
thoroughly applied), then obviously one can do so even less in relation to the
industrial and military sectors. Thus we can safely conclude that National Socialism
fully accepted technology. Like large parts of the political right of the Weimar
Republic, the Nazis saw it as a necessary means for realising their vision of the
future, especially their expansionist goals. Nevertheless there were important
differences between visions such as the one JuÈnger had developed in `The Worker'
and the Nazi attitude towards technology:
1. While Ernst JuÈnger and other conservatives in the Weimar Republic had
eventually realised that systematic work in large technological systems is a necessary
prerequisite for ef®ciency under modern conditions (this was exactly their original
contribution to a conservative understanding of modern technology), National
Socialism largely maintained the belief held by earlier or less advanced techno-
enthusiasts that exceptionally gifted personalities with strong willpower could
overcome all the odds and turn technology into an obedient servant. It neither saw
the need to speak the `language' of technology and adapt to its imperatives, nor did
it realise the dialectical connection between using technology and submitting to a
technological lifestyle. In their conviction that technology would simply be a
wonderful tool in their hands, National Socialists did not show any awareness of the
power of technology over its users. Their naive optimism was immune to the
disenchanting experiences of the First World War and the ensuing economic crises,
because they had the Jews, the communists and the Versailles Treaty to blame for all
such negative developments.
2. On a more practical level, Nazi policy never aimed for the consistency and all-
pervasive planning necessary to realise a technocratic state. One can ®nd techno-
cratic tendencies, but more characteristic, as historians such as Hans Mommsen and
Martin Broszat have shown, are the many compromises with different social groups
and large numbers of competing persons and institutions. Society was not supposed
to function like a machine, but according to Darwinist social principles, according
to which the strongest would prevail. This produced a `leadership chaos' which
70 Hans-Erich Volkmann, `Die NS Wirtschaft in Vorbereitung des Krieges', in MilitaÈrgeschich-
tliches Forschungsamt, ed., Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 1: Ursachen und
Voraussetzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik, (Stuttgart: DVA, 1979), 177±370, at 191.
71 Volkmann, `Die NS Wirtschaft', 298±300, 217 f.
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clearly weakened the ef®ciency of the Nazi system.72 Continuous improvisation
instead of long-term strategies, the lack of clear bureaucratic structures and areas of
responsibilities, the thwarting of long-term plans by the sudden decisions of leading
National Socialists, the short-term exploitation of resources, the lack of control of
ef®ciency via a fully functional ®nancial system, the destruction of social relations
and open exchange of information, all demonstrate a lack of understanding of the
functioning of modern industry and technology.73 Hitler's reliance on the `creative
power and ability of individual people' and his and Speer's order to the military
personnel to ask industry for new or better weapons, if they needed them,74 shows a
lack of understanding of the need for coordinated and systematic research as well as
of the logic of technical developments and innovations. A clear decline in patents
and developments was the inevitable consequence.
3. The National Socialist cultural policy was also marked by inconsistencies.
While the modernists on the left and right demanded that all cultural forms should
re¯ect the functions of the technical age by abandoning all unnecessary decoration
(`form follows function'), National Socialism corresponded with the popular taste,
which more often than not did not want a correspondence between material
reality and form, but an emotional compensation for the de®cits of a functional
modernity. In contrast to JuÈnger's futurist demand for a functional logic and a
technical style, which was to penetrate and determine all aspects of society and
human existence, National Socialism rejected purist attempts to close the gap
between technology and culture, favouring an undogmatic mix instead. In
literature, novels about exceptional engineers and technological achievements75
co-existed with sentimental stories about rural life; for the national party meeting
in 1934 (communicated to us mainly through the modern medium of ®lm, via the
famous Triumph of the Will) the historic city of Nuremberg was used as background
for Hitler's arrival in his aeroplane, for mass rallies and military parades with
modern armaments; the `beauty of work' programme promoted swimming pools,
grass and gardens, but also an increase in productivity; and the attempt to increase
agricultural production was connected with an invention and promotion of
72 Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 3rd edn. (New York:
Arnold, 1993), 63. R. Overy rightly stresses that it took Germany until 1937 to regain the level of
production of 1929. Productivity remained markedly lower than in Great Britain and the United States
(R. J. Overy, The Nazi economic recovery 1932±1938, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996)).
73 Hans Mommsen, `Nationalsozialismus als vorgetaÈuschte Modernisierung', in Hans Mommsen,
ed., Der Nationalsozialismus und die deutsche Gesellschaft. AusgewaÈhlte AufsaÈtze, (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1991),
312±34.
74 Hitler quoted in Karl-Heinz Ludwig, Technik und Ingenieure im Dritten Reich (DuÈsseldorf: Droste,
1974), 228; Conversation between Hitler and Speer (4 Apr. 1942) quoted in Ludwig, 248. For statistics
of patents, see Ludwig, 227.
75 Hans-Joachim Braun, `Konstruktion, Destruktion und der Ausbau technischer Systeme zwischen
1914 und 1945', in Wolfgang KoÈnig, ed., PropylaÈen Technikgeschichte, Vol. 5 (Berlin: PropylaÈen, 1992),
9±279, at 264 f.; Hans-Werner Niemann, `Die Beurteilung und Darstellung der modernen Technik in
deutschen Romanen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts', in Technikgeschichte, Vol. 46, no. 4 (1979), 306±21, at
317 f. A representative example is the novel by Arno Thauû, Der Mann, der das Gas bezwang (1933).
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`traditions' such as wearing traditional costumes, engaging in folk dance or
accompanying the passing on of the farm to the son with a festive ritual.76
This decoration of modern reality with all forms available from past and present
as well as the ousting of a more critical `decadent art', was artistically simplistic,
because it was directed against any critical re¯ection on developments in society.
But it corresponded with the modern trend towards cultural forms which satisfy the
mass of the population and anticipated the distinction in design between public and
private. This is particularly clear in Nazi architecture. It did not break completely
with the modern functional style, but used it primarily for commercial buildings, in
road construction and town planning. Of®cial buildings were designed in the
classical or monumental style, and residential housing was ideally built in accordance
with a traditional regional style. While the industrial sphere was thus supposed to be
functional and the political sphere awe-inspiring, the private sphere was aiming to
give a feeling of warmth and cosiness, even if one could only afford blocks of ¯ats
constructed out of standardised parts for the mass of the population.77
National Socialism did not share JuÈnger's concept of a `heroic realism' (which
was also not alien to other modernists with their celebration of an inhumane
coldness). It accepted that even people who want to be heroes have secret selves,
whose `tastes lie toward safety, soft beds, no work, pots of beer and women with
``voluptuous'' ®gures.'78 They thus used heroic imagery on an ideological level, but
tried to keep the sacri®ces of their followers to a minimum. To avoid dissatisfaction
and unrest, grain was imported to feed the population, although it slowed the
armament programme, social policy was supposed to win popular support and
entertainment dominated in radio and ®lm over boring propaganda. As Goebbels
said about radio and cinema: `The [radio] programme . . . should present education,
stimulation and entertainment in a clever mixture. Relaxation and entertainment
have to be considered foremost, because the large majority of listeners often lead a
hard and relentless life . . . They have a right to ®nd relaxation and recovery in their
few hours of leisure and quiet.'79 `The darker the streets are, the lighter our theatres
and cinemas have to be . . . The harder the time is, the brighter must our art be to
console the human soul.'80
As a consequence, between 60 and 70 per cent of radio programmes and more
76 Peter Reichel, Der schoÈne Schein des Dritten Reiches. Faszination und Gewalt des Faschismus
(Frankfurt/M: Fischer, 1993), 232 ff.; J. E. Farquharson, The Plough and the Swastika. The NSDAP and
Agriculture in Germany 1928±45 (London: Sage-Publications, 1976), 203±20.
77 Barbara Miller Lane, Architektur und Politik in Deutschland 1918±1945 (Braunschweig: Vieweg,
1986); Reichel, Der schoÈne Schein, 287 ff.; Werner Durth, `Architektur und Stadtplanung im Dritten
Reich' and Ronald Smelser, `Die Sozialplanung der deutschen Arbeiterfront', both in Michael Prinz
and Rainer Zitelmann eds., Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1991).
78 G. Orwell, `The Art of Donald McGill', The Collected Essays. Journalism and Letters of George
Orwell, ed. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, Vol. 2 (London: Secker & Warburg, 1968), 163. Also see
Parin's distinction between satisfaction in a role and the ideology of a role Paul Parin, Der Widerspruch
im Subjekt (Frankfurt/M.: Syndikat, 1978), 123.
79 Quoted in Reichel, Der schoÈne Schein, 168.
80 Quoted in Reichel, Der schoÈne Schein, 180.
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than 50 per cent of ®lm production could be classi®ed as pure entertainment, while
the amount of political indoctrination was strictly controlled.
As a whole National Socialism had, one can conclude, a positive attitude towards
technology, although some critical arguments can be identi®ed. Different opinions
could exist, because technology was not seen as a value or a force in itself. If one
accepts that the creation of a pure `Aryan' race and German expansion were the two
main goals of National Socialism, then the attitude towards technology could vary
and alter, because its value was determined by the question whether it threatened or
helped to achieve those goals. A few National Socialists were against technology,
because they believed that it would undermine the strength of the `Aryan race', but
most were convinced that the National Socialist goals could only be achieved by
means of a full embrace of modern technology. Like the group of those right-wing
extremists in the Weimar Republic which Herf has named `reactionary modernists'
(but also like many other conservatives), National Socialism accepted technology as
an important tool in achieving their militaristic and racist goals.
But while the modernists on the right tried to face the fact that technology also
places demands on its users and thereby alters them and society, National Socialism
drew on less sophisticated beliefs more typical of conservatives in imperial Germany.
As they had enough scapegoats to blame for all problems, they could uphold the
belief that technology would become an obedient servant, if only there was a
determined political will. In holding previous political systems, their political
opponents and the Jews responsible for unintended and unwanted aspects of the
technical age, they did not acknowledge the full consequences of using modern
technology and ignored the functional demands of large technical systems. This
helped them in gaining and maintaining political power, because they did not
challenge the existing order as fundamentally as somebody like JuÈnger and were
more open to pragmatic compromises.81 But they paid the price of a low economic
ef®ciency.
For National Socialism, there was no reason to follow the modernists' attempt to
create a culture re¯ecting the industrial age with its stress on functionality and
minimal means. Instead of developing a technological aesthetic, they stuck to the
nineteenth-century notion that outside the sphere of production aesthetics meant
decoration, something applied to the surface of objects to hide their ugly reality.
The technical age was accepted as a practical necessity, but not celebrated in a
technical style; people had to ful®l their function, but relaxation and distraction
were granted; and culture was consciously employed as an escape from a dreary or
horrifying material reality. In this respect, the National Socialists arrived at a more
sustainable lifestyle within modern reality than the modernists: in their openness to
compromise in all but their core beliefs they accepted that the demands of the
81 Before JuÈnger became appalled by the crimes of National Socialism in power, his criticism of the
party in its movement phase had mainly been directed against their lack of uncompromising radicalness
(Karlheinz Weiûmann, `Maurice BarreÁs und der ``Nationalismus'' im FruÈhwerk Ernst JuÈngers', in
GuÈnter Figal and Heimo Schwilk eds., Magie der Heiterkeit. Ernst JuÈnger zum Hundertsten (Stuttgart:
Klett-Cotta, 1995), 141 f.).
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modern functional age were only bearable if allowance was made for compensation
and escapism.82 National Socialism was popular and politically successful because it
acknowledged and tolerated different forces and desires in human beings, thereby
avoiding purist extremes. Ironically, the Nazis' simplistic world-view (with their
trust in the positive potential of a pure Nordic race and their identi®cation of
scapegoats to explain away unintended and undesired developments) allowed them
to absorb pragmatically a whole variety of impulses of the time and thereby integrate
different important social groups.
Herf is right in arguing against earlier opinions that National Socialism cannot be
understood as completely antimodern, because it made full use of technology. But
his attempt to identify one peculiar tradition of `reactionary modernism' which
prepares the ground for National Socialism is not convincing. First of all, and most
importantly, he constructs and solves a problem that does not exist. It is simply not
strange or `paradoxical to reject the Enlightenment and embrace technology at the
same time',83 but common practice in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany
as well as in many other countries. Instrumental reason and technology are available
for an endless number of different purposes, many of which are not humane or
enlightened.84 Secondly, National Socialism does not have just one cultural root. It
was eclectic, drawing on many different traditions and reacting pragmatically to the
circumstances of the time. As its attitude towards technology was mainly pragmatic,
it could take many different forms. The attempt to maintain power and achieve its
central policy goals largely determined its usage of technology, not a preconceived
world view.
If my argument is right we are left with one last point: why is it so important to
historians and their public to see National Socialism as not fully modern? Why was
Stern's book, The Politics of Cultural Despair so well received that the Times Literary
Supplement regards it as one of the twenty-two most in¯uential books of the 1960s85
and the term `reactionary modernism' has found wide acceptance? Without doubt it
is of the highest importance to study the origins of a regime which committed
unequalled crimes and to deal critically with all those aspects of German history
which made its rise to power possible. But why this widespread refusal to accept
that National Socialism existed within the framework of modern societies and
showed speci®cally modern features? Why associate romantic dreams like `nature
82 It is true that some art consciously avoided functioning as compensation, because it aimed to
motivate people to make material reality more humane instead of just making it appear more humane.
This is a laudable attempt, but my conclusion still remains the same: as they did not succeed in changing
material reality, the compensatory model proved more successful.
83 Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 3.
84 By de®nition instrumental reason is concerned with the means, not with the ends. All modern
technology has for example its `potentiel de guerre', as Ernst JuÈnger convincingly showed in his early
work (JuÈnger, Das Abenteuerliche Herz, 80).
85 Times Literary Supplement, 6 Oct. 1995, 39. See more generally about the book Jerry Z. Muller,
` ``The Politics of Cultural Despair'' Revisited', in Marion F. Deshmukh and Jerry Z. Muller, eds., Fritz
Stern at 70, German Historical Institute, Occasional Paper No 19 (1997), 21±32
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mysticism'86 or the utopian vision of the 1960s rebellion of youth with National
Socialism,87 but not a technocratic emphasis on instrumental reason and technical
®xes? Why deny that the widespread acceptance of dangerous and inhumane
(pseudo)-scienti®c ideas such as racism, mad ideas like a Jewish world conspiracy
and the desire for an authoritarian, non-pluralistic national community can result
from a crisis of modernity?
If the dividing line between National Socialism and modernity is drawn
categorically, the critical scrutiny of German history can easily turn into an
apologia for modernity. One has to agree with Zygmunt Bauman that `the
interpretation of the Holocaust as a singular eruption of pre-modern (barbaric,
irrational) forces, as yet insuf®ciently tamed or ineffectually suppressed by
(presumably weak or faulty) German modernization' can also ful®l the function of
`marginalising the crime and exonerating modernity'.88 Instead of calling Theodor
W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer `strangely apologetic', as Herf does, because
they allegedly mistook a uniquely German phenomenon by interpreting it as the
darkest side of modernity,89 it is more convincing to argue that the stress on the
non-modern character of National Socialism can serve to pull the sting out of all
the Nazi crimes and belittle the dangerous aspects of modernity which Dialectic of
Enlightenment tries to analyse.90 Instead of distancing modernity from National
Socialism, we should learn to accept that it was by no means a necessary, but was a
possible development within modernity. In that sense, National Socialism shows
modernity's most fatal potential.91
86 Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, 2
87 Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair, Preface to 2nd ed. (1974).
88 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 18.
89 Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 10.
90 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 3rd edn. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 10.
Theodor W. Adorno/Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972).
91 Detlev Peukert, Max Webers Diagnose der Moderne (GoÈttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1989), 82. Peukert's
characterisation of National Socialism as a `pathology of modernity' seems less convincing, as it disguises
a value judgment by using a medical term. The term also draws a categorical distinction which does not
account for `pathological' aspects such as militarism or eugenics in non-fascist societies and a
continuation of `non-pathological' trends in fascist societies.
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